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Abstract
A large body of literature has stressed the institution-development nexus
as critical in explaining diﬀerences in countries’ economic performance. The
empirical evidence, however, has been mainly at the aggregate level, associat-
ing macro performance with measures of quality of institutions. This paper,
by relating a judicial decision on the legality of payroll debit loans in Brazil
to bank-level decision variables, provides micro evidence on how creditor legal
protection aﬀects market performance. Payroll debit loans are personal loans
with principal and interests payments directly deducted from the borrowers’
payroll check, which, in practice, makes a collateral out of future income. In
June 2004, a high-level federal court upheld a regional court ruling that had
declared payroll deduction illegal. Using personal loans without payroll de-
duction as a control group, we assess whether the ruling had an impact on
market performance. Evidence indicates that it had an adverse impact on
banks’ risk perception, on interest rates, and on the amount lent.
KEYWORDS: Institutions, Judicial Risk, Credit Markets, Diﬀerence-in-
Diﬀerence
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31 Introduction
In recent years, the literature has built a near consensus that "sound" institutions
are congenial to good economic performance (North [1994]). Institutions, insofar as
they determine the economic environment agents operate in, should be important
for explaining economic outcomes. Quite often, the speciﬁc mechanism through
which institutions inﬂuence economic performance is protection from expropriation.
In environments in which expropriation is likely, agents underinvest (from a social
perspective) relative to more secure ones. In the end, a plethora of sub-optimal
microeconomic decisions amount to a poorer aggregate economic performance.
Indeed, most of the empirical eﬀort in associating institutional "soundness",
however deﬁned, and economic performance has been on the aggregate level. An
observation on a typical study is a country (La Porta et al. [1998A] is a seminal
example). Institutional measures are then linked to economic performance on var-
ious dimensions. La Porta et al. [1998A], for example, document that the origin
of the legal system is associated with the degree of creditor protection. La Porta
et al. [1997] ﬁnd that a lower degree of creditor protection implies smaller debt
and equity markets.1 Another set of articles study the ﬁnancial deepening-economic
growth link (King and Levine [1993], Levine and Zervos [1998]), ﬁnding a positive
relationship. Taken all together, these papers seem to imply the following chain of
causality. At the basic level, legal origin (institution) cause creditor protection (pro-
tection from expropriation). At the second stage, better creditor protection cause
ﬁnancial deepening. Finally, ﬁnancial deepening causes economic growth.
This chain of causality would be more convincing were microeconomic evidence
available. The missing link is due to the level of analysis, much broader than the
relevant locus of economic decisions. There is, for example, an implicit assumption
1Pinheiro and Cabral [1998] follow this tradition for the Brazilian credit market. Using state-
level data on outstanding volumes of credit, and an index of judicial eﬃciency (based on the results
of a survey conducted with businessmen on each state where they rate the quality of the local ju-
diciary), they relate variation in judicial ineﬃciency to diﬀerences in outstanding volumes of credit
across the states. The authors conclude, corroborating the institution-development hypothesis,
that improving the eﬃciency of judicial enforcement is important for credit markets development.
4that agents do invest less if creditors protection is lower. For several reasons, it is
hard to be completely convincing with such an aggregate level of analysis. One such
reason is reverse causality. The following example, however farfetched, is illustrative.
Assume investment is completely inelastic, and creditor protection is a superior
good. Creditor protection, in this setting, has only distributive, not allocative,
eﬀects. For demand reasons, there is, however, a reverse causality running from
income to creditor protection. Evidently, investment is not completely inelastic but
the demand driven story is still conceivable. Most of the studies do recognize this
possibility, and try to ﬁnd suﬃciently exogenous variation to relate institutions and
economic performance. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson [2001] and Levine [1998]
are good examples of careful searches for such variation.
Another problem stems from the fact that legal procedures are "chosen" by
society, and hence may be endogenously designed to tackle the issues often put as
the dependent variables in the regressions. La Porta et al [2003] face this diﬃculty.
They argue that legal formalism reduces the quality of the judicial system. But
formalism, as they recognize it, could also be a response to "weaker law and order
environment". Their strategy is to use the fact that most countries inherit their legal
tradition (and that French civil law is more "formalistic"), which makes the legal
tradition a source of exogenous variation. Again, the story is compelling insofar as it
is prohibitively costly for countries to "change" their legal tradition, since otherwise
"maintenance" of tradition would itself be endogenous.
However well argued (as it is the case in all papers cited), identiﬁcation is mostly
a rethorical issue, since one can only test for overidentiﬁcation. With micro level
evidence, these issues can be bypassed, and one can directly assess how market
participants respond to varying institutional environments. Creditor protection and
ﬁnancial deepening is an example. If there is evidence that creditors price judicial
risk, or restrain quantities in face of weak protection, then it becomes much more
compelling that legal protection induces ﬁnancial deepening. In this case, one could
be much more conﬁdent that the causality from creditor protection to income is of
5ﬁrst-order, as opposed to demand driven explanations, such as protection being a
superior good.
A third reason is omitted factors. Several other countries’ characteristics might
determine both institutional setting (such as legal origin and level of creditor pro-
tection, the usual explanatory variables) and economic performance (the usual re-
gressand). Consider again the Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson strategy for ﬁnding ex-
ogenous variation in institutional soundness to estimate the institution-economic
performance link.2 For former colonies, one conceivable alternative story is the
type of colonization. Suppose that, for sheer coincidence, while countries with a
French civil law tradition (usually interpreted as “unsound” institutions) occupied
lands that had valuables goods for the European market (silver in Peru and sugar
in Brazil, for instance), countries with common law tradition (“sound” institutions)
arrived at places that had few "tradable" goods with Europe (early English coloniza-
tion of the US). Suppose as well that this trade feature determined how exploitative
colonization was, and that exploitation had long lasting eﬀects. In this case, the
(omitted) driving force is whether there were comparative advantages to be ex-
plored. However, “sound” institutions and (later) economic performance would still
relate empirically, although causal interpretation would not be warranted. We do
not claim the institutional settings do not matter, and that the legal tradition only
enters the picture through trade "causing" both institutional settings and economic
performance. The crucial point is that, with micro level evidence, it is unnecessary
to be concerned about such alternative explanations.
Finally, measurement is intrinsically more problematic with aggregate data. In
La Porta et al. [1998], (country-level) creditor protection is measured by character-
istics of the countries´ corporate laws, and by several indices.3 Besides the inherent
arbitrariness in constructing such indices, theory not always provides clear guidance
2Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson [2001] document that “better institutions" arose in countries
where mortality rates due to native diseases were low when colonizers originally arrived. This,
according to the authors, shift the equation that determines institutions but not the equation that
determines current economic performance.
3They have indices for, among others, eﬃciency of the judicial system, risk of expropriation,
and risk of repudiation of contracts by government.
6in interpreting the results. For example, is it theoretically clear that restricting the
behavior of managers always increases the amount of ﬁnance in equilibrium?I ti s
conceivable that, if you suﬃciently restrict managers´ behavior, the size of debt
and equity market will be small, for reasons pertaining to the supply of securities?
Without a clear theoretical support, an empirical ﬁnding that restricting managers´
behavior is associated with "larger" equity and debt markets is subject to criticisms
that micro-evidence is not. One such criticism is the presence of non-linearities in
the creditor protection-market performance relation.4
It might seem puzzling the relative lack of micro evidence on the institution-
development nexus. We conjecture that this is due to the scarcity of a fortunate
coincidence: data on both the relevant economic decision locus (ﬁrms, consumers)
linked to variation on institutional settings. La Porta et al. [2003] study on the
formality of legal procedures and the quality of the legal system is somewhat an
exception.5 They do not, however, directly associate market level performance with
diﬀerent institutional settings.
In this work, we take advantage of a particular set of events that provide variation
on a relevant institutional setting and we are able to associate this variation with
data on the relevant economic decision locus. The empirical setting is the market for
Payroll Debit Loans in Brazil. Payroll Debit Loans are personal loans with principal
and interests payments directly deducted from the borrowers’ payroll check, which,
in practice, makes a collateral out of future income. In June 2004, a high-level
federal court upheld a regional court ruling that had declared payroll deduction il-
legal.6 The decision by the federal court has a case speciﬁc nature, i.e. only applies
to this particular dispute. There is, however, evidence from market practioners that
there was an increase in the perceived probability that the decision could establish
4Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik [2003] show that, with incomplete markets, that intermediate
levels of debtor punishment can induce a larger quantity of credit that extreme levels of debtor
punishment.
5In this paper, the authors study the link between formality of the legal system and the time
elapsed to evict non-paying tenants, and to recover a bounced check. Furthermore, they associate
formality with other measures of judicial system performance, such as corruption, and access to
justice.
6The court ruled at the very end of June (28th). However, the press release was on July 1st.
7precedent, and turn useless the future income collateral. Using personal loans with-
out payroll deduction as a control group, a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence procedure assess
whether the judicial decision had an impact on market performance. As a preview,
the data on bank level suggest that the decision had an adverse impact on banks’
risk perception, on interest rates, and on the amount lent. In this sense, this is
direct evidence of market participants’ reaction to institutional risk.
Our theory is simple to the point of trivial: an increase in the chance of expro-
priating the collateral should shift the supply of loans inward, worsening market
performance. Whether the empirical consequences are ﬁrst order is far from trivial.
This is, indeed, the goal of the paper: investigate whether a clear-cut shift in the
institutional setting has microeconomic consequences. Evidence from market prat-
ictioners is ambiguous. While some important players had the perception that the
decision could have strong adverse eﬀects, equally important players thought the
eﬀect would be second order.
The market level evidence is a complement, not a substitute, to the aggregate
level evidence. Indeed, our results in no way contradict the literature. On the
contrary, they corroborate it. While aggregate evidence indicates that institutional
diﬀerences are of ﬁrst-order importance in explaining variation in countries’ perfor-
mances, micro and market level evidence evaluates directly the implicit assumption
necessary to interpret the aggregate evidence as indeed causal.
The result has an additional interest given the empirical application. Payroll
Lending is one of the workhorses of the recent Brazilian credit market expansion.
Brazil, in La Porta-Lopez-Silanes-Shleifer-Vishny tradition, is a French civil law
country, with low creditor protection. Credit markets are relatively underdeveloped.
Recently, however, it has make several eﬀorts towards a more creditor friendly in-
stitutional environment. Courts may be particularly important in an environment
with weak creditor protection, where other protective institutions, such as laws, are
weak or inexistent.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the recent evolution of credit
8market in Brazil and the chronology of Payroll lending, emphasizing the relevant
events, such as the approval in congress of the law regulating Payroll Lending for
retirees and the judicial decision on the legality of payroll deductions. Section 3
presents the data, and Section 4 the empirical strategy. We argue that the presence
of an identical product, except for deduction in payroll, provides a good control for
associating changes in the institutional environment to market changes in Payroll
Lending. Results are presented and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Credit Market in Brazil: Recent Evolution and
Payroll Lending
In recent years, bank lending experienced a pronounced increase in Brazil, specially
in lending out of banks’ "free lending funds" (those not earmarked by mandatory
programs). Between July 1999 and September 2005, the free loans/GDP ratio went
from 8.3% to 17.1% (Figure 1). This free loan segment now represents 67% of total


























































































































































































































































Private Banking Credit/GDP - 1999 to 2005 (Free Loans)
7Numbers for December, 2005. Banking credit portfolios in Brazil have two types of loans: free
market operations, where banks can set quantity and prices according to their proﬁt maximizing
behaviour; and compulsory directed credit operations - mostly channeled to housing and rural
sectors at subsidized interest rates.
9Interestingly, this tendency of ﬁnancial deepening took place during a period of
tight monetary policy 8. Despite this fact, free market lending expanded remarkably.
Several factors help explain this trend.
These speciﬁc factors are all linked to institutional reforms that took place in
Brazil since the end of 1999. Measures included: eﬀorts to reduce information
asymmetries in credit markets (such as the new credit ranking and provisioning
regulation, through Resolution 2.682/99, and the Central Bank Credit Information
System (SCR), implemented in 1999 and improved in 2000 and 2004); more eﬃcient
instruments of collateral recognition and contract enforcement (as the so-called "Cé-
dula de Crédito Bancário", a claim with faster execution procedures, in 2001 and
2004)9; a better insolvency resolution system (through a new bankruptcy law, ap-
proved by Congress in the end of 2004); and regulation of creative credit instruments,
such as payroll lending. They provided an improved institutional environment and
possibly led to the observed higher volumes of credit concessions by the Brazilian
banking sector. As suggested in the previous cited literature, the evolution towards
a more creditor friendly environment might have engendered this initial movement
of ﬁnancial deepening in Brazil.
Nevertheless, this rapid expansion path — more pronounced during the last two
years — is not observed in all credit market segments. On the contrary, this accel-
eration is mainly explained by growing volumes of consumer loans. Credit to this
segment, which in 1999 represented 3.6% of GDP (or 9% of total private bank credit
portfolio), reached in 2005 outstanding volumes that amount 8.7% of GDP (or 31%
of total private bank credit portfolio). Consequently, since December 2004, personal
8Brazil adopted Inﬂation Target and Floating Exchange Rate regimes in 1999 during a liquidity
crisis, exchange rate devaluation and inﬂation pressure. Interest rates where the main instrument
used to stabilize the economy. Inﬂation targets are set by Nacional Monetary Council and ba-
sic interest rates are monthly deﬁned by Central Bank in Monetary Policy Comittee (COPOM)
meetings.
9The SCR brings detailed information on borrower´s credit contracts of over R$5,000.00.
(roughly U$2,200.00).
10loans respond for the biggest part of total bank loans, with an even higher partic-



















































































































































































Industry Rural Sector Commerce Services Personal Credit
STJ ruling
Private Banking Credit/GDP - Evolution by Economic Segment (1999 to 2005)
Consumer credit loans in Brazil can be divided into three main types of loans.
The personal loan, for consumption purposes; loans for vehicle acquisition; and
Cheque Especial, a consumer overdraft facility. It is, however, in the personal loan
category — the largest category, that a major growth is observed (52% during the
last twelve months),as showed in Figure 3.
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Overdraft Loans Personal Loans Vehicle Acquisition "Credit Cards"
Personal Lending in Brazil
This paper is concerned with personal loans, which are further divided into two
sub-categories: the standard loan contract (hereafter standard loan), and a special
type of personal loan contract that has an automatic monthly payment deducted
from the borrower’s salary. This is the payroll lending operation (Crédito Consignado
em Folha de Pagamento, hereafter payroll loan), which represents over 35% of all
consumer credit in Brazil, and whose growth path has shown a particularly notice-
able increase. Figure 4 shows the evolution of payroll lending operations, and its
increasing participation on total personal loans, for the thirteen largest active banks
in this segment.10
10Brazilian Central Bank collects this data for this small - but representative - sample of banks










































































































Payroll Loans Payroll/Personal Loans
Personal Lending in Brazil - Recent Evolution
Payroll lending exists in Brazil since the beginning of the 1990s. It was restricted
to government personnel and was originally operated by peculium institutions, which
had the possibility to act as trusts before public administration agencies.11 But since
the second half of the 1990s some ﬁnancial institutions identiﬁed in this type of loan
a good business opportunity, with low credit risk and high return. Those banks
entered this credit market through the acquisition of peculium institutions already
registered as trustees.
2.1 Payroll Loans: Description of the Product, Chronology
of Events, and Pratictioners’ Opinions
The decisive expansion of payroll lending operations occurred in September 2003,
when the government sent to Congress a provisory law (Medida Provisória (MP)
130), subsequently turned into Law 10.820/03.12 The law regulated the possibility
of salary consignation for private sector formal workers, and for retired workers from
private sector and pensionaries covered by the National Institution of Social Security
11Law 8.112/90 admits the possibility of payroll consignation for government personnel.
12Medida provisória is a legislative device in which the executive sends a bill to congress that
is eﬀective immediatly, pending approval. It has an urgency status that forces the legislator to
appreciate its merit. For practical purposes, it is almost equivalent to a full-blown law.
13(INSS).13
In practice, payroll deduction turns future income into collateral. Evidently,
future income is valuable as a collateral insofar as it is not too volatile. This is
precisely why payroll lending is mainly used for the following three types of borrow-
ers. Before the 2003 law extended regulation to private sector retirees, banks lent
to public servants, which have employment stability. Banks then started operating
with private sector workers, but in association with the labor unions and employers.
Contracts are collective, which mitigates idiosyncractic income risk. Finally, after
the December 2003 law, banks started operations with retirees from the private sec-
tor, which also have a constant income ﬂow. The main risk lenders face is death,
which is diversiﬁable and insurable.
Lenders, however, face another peril: judicial risk. Collateral has value only if
courts recognize it as such. Payroll lending in Brazil provides an excellent empirical
setting to assess judicial risk. In 2002, a public servant of the city of Porto Alegre
(the capital of the state of Rio Grande do Sul) sued Banco Sudameris claiming
the payroll deduction on his salary was illegal.14 A state-level court (Tribunal de
Justiça do Rio Grande do Sul) ruled for the plaintiﬀ. The decision did not draw
much attention for two reasons. First, by that time, payroll lending was not such
an important credit instrument. Second, the decision did not set a precedent, once
it was related to a claim that started before the 2003 law, and had been ruled by
a state-level court. Sudameris appealed to the second highest ranking federal court
in the country, the Superior Tribunal de Justiça (STJ).15 In late June 2004, the
STJ upheld the regional court ruling. Although technically this decision also did
13The Brazilian pension system, a pay-as-you-go scheme, is publicly managed by this govern-
mental agency, INSS.
14The deduction was R$58.66 (roughly U$22 by then), to cover amortization and interest ex-
penses on a R$1.015 loan. The precise claim was that wages are essential for subsistence, and
therefore cannot be pawned. Furthermore, the monthly nominal interest rate of 3.8% was ruled
"abusive". See Valor Econômico 07/02/2004. For the actual decision, see the STJ website,
http://www.stj.gov.br.
15Hierarchically, the STJ stands between the STF (Supremo Tribunal Federal), the equivalent
of the American Supreme Court, and the TFJs (Tribunais Federais de Justiça), equivalent to the
American Federal Circuit Courts.
14not set precedent on the issue, it could signal the direction of future rulings.16 In
this case, the future income collateral could become useless. At the time, Minister
Edson Vidigal, from the STJ, declared that "...[when] analyzed through the salary
perspective, the consignation can be suspended," and "[banks] might have to search
for alternative forms of guarantees."17
Statements by some key pratictioners suggest that banks perceived this as a haz-
ard to their payroll loans operations. Right after the decision, the Chief of Judicial
Operations of Federação Brasileira de Bancos (FEBRABAN, the main bankers’s as-
sociation), Johan Albino Ribeiro, declared to the press that "... undoubtedly there
will be a repercussion in terms of higher interest rates" since "...[one] of the elements
that sustain the low interest rates is the low risk on these loans. If the legality of the
contract is contested, the risk increases".18 Luís Marinho, then the head of Central
Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT), the main workers’s union, reported that he had
received phone calls from several bankers informing "...[that] banks would hit the
break on new loans, at least temporarily, until they have a better understanding of
the extension of the STJ decision." 1920
However, whether banks indeed reacted to the decision in an economically mean-
ingful way is not obvious. Indeed, it was not even clear whether, legally, the court
ruling would have a lasting eﬀect. As it was noted, the decision only applied to one
speciﬁc claim, related to a public servant and which took place before the Decem-
ber 2003 formal regulation. Therefore the STJ decision could not, technically set
precedent for future lawsuits. Several banking lawyers thought the law regulating
payroll loans (Law 10.820/03) was crystal clear.21 In this sense, all the decision
could signal was the courts’ mood toward payroll loans. Furthermore, banks could
have simply ignored it. Indeed, Gabriel Jorge Ferreira (a former head of FEBRA-
BAN), from UNIBANCO (the third largest private bank in Brazil), declared that
16STJ rulings are case speciﬁc, and do not set precedent.
17See Gazeta Mercantil, 16/07/2004.
18See Valor Econômico, 07/02/2004.
19Mr. Marinho would later be appointed Minister of Labor.
20See Universo Online, 07/04/2004, http://an.uol.com.br/2004/jul/04/0eco.htm
21See Valor Econômico, 07/02/2004, 08/13/2004.
15"...[the program] is still intact, and I do not think there will be an upward pressure
in interest rates."22 Indeed, this is precisely our object of study: whether there is
evidence that this judicial hazard had a ﬁrst-order impact on market performance.
In our application, an aﬃrmative answer would be even more meaningful given the
ambiguity of both the (practical) legal consequences of the ruling, and the bankers’
reactions. As ﬁgure 4 shows, it is clear that the court ruling has not prevented the
recent growth of payroll loans. There is, nonetheless, a couple of interesting con-
trafactual questions left to ask. Absent the decision, would this growth have been
more pronounced? Would terms be better (i.e. lower interest rates)?
3 Data
Using original data from Central Bank Credit Information System (SCR), we con-
structed a data set on payroll and standard loans. For both types of credit contracts
we have bank level monthly data over a period starting on January 2003 and ending
on May 2005. There is, initially, data for 109 active banks on outstanding volumes of
payroll and standard personal lending operations. We have bank-level information
on: the total amount of loans; average risk rating; average interest rate; number of
credit contracts; and average size of the credit contract 23
The data has information on loan contracts above R$ 5,000 (U$2,270). An av-
erage sized contract is R$84,719 (U$38,508) This strongly indicates that contracts
in the data are mainly indirect, i.e., with entities such as labor unions and govern-
mental agencies, which intermediate the negotiation, and afterwards refer the bank
to their employees or members. Contracting directly with individuals began mostly
after the December-2003 law, which regulated payroll lending to private sector re-
tirees. Since it took at least another 5 months for a signiﬁcant group of banks to
be chartered by National Institution of Social Security (INSS), the fact that these
22See Universo Online, 07/04/2004, http://an.uol.com.br/2004/jul/04/0eco.htm
23Interest rate is weighted by the volume of new concessions at each risk category. Credit risk
rating goes from 1 (or AA operations: less risk) to 10 (or HH operations: maximum risk), following
provisioning and classiﬁcation criteria set by Nacional Monetary Council regulation.
16loans do not show in our data is relatively immaterial.24
In order to keep consistency among observations, banks had to satisfy several
criteria to be part of the ﬁnal sample used. First, only banks that consistently
operated in both credit products were included. This avoids picking up unrelated
(to the court ruling) entry and exit decisions, which are but noise for our purposes.
Only banks that supplied both standard and payroll loans for the whole Jan/04-
Dec/04 period were included. Second, banks that had inconsistent pricing behavior
were excluded. For example, several banks had annual nominal interest rates at 12%,
which are clearly out of line with the rest of the market. 12% operations are either
reporting errors, or special loans such as those to own employees, which we conjecture
to have a diﬀerent risk assessment nature. Other banks had inconsistent structural
breaks on the interest rate series25. Finally, it is not clear whether government-
owned banks (both state and federal) have the same objective function as their
private counterparts. The literature is ambiguous with this respect. Although some
works suggest that there is no evidence that public owned banks are less eﬃcient
than private counterparts (Altubas et al. [2001]), there is little controversy over their
diﬀerent lending behavior (Sapienza [2002]). And, for Brazil, even if government-
owned banks had the same objective function as private banks, payroll loans is an
important piece of policy for the current federal government, and federally owned
banks might be responding to public policy rather than maximizing proﬁts regarding
payroll loans.26 For these reasons, government-owned banks.were excluded.
24The December-2003 law required the bank to be chartered by the INSS in order to supply
payoll lending to private sector employees. The ﬁrst bank to be charted was the Caixa Econômica
Federal (a federal government bank), in May 2004.
25It is important to emphasize that we identiﬁed some problems with the interest rate variable
in SCR data set. For this reason we are less conﬁdent about the interest rate results than the other
results presented in Section 5. The SCR regulation states that interest rates must be reported on
a yearly basis. Nevertheless, not only inconsistent numbers such as zero or very low rates abound,
but also rates that seem to be monthly or contract period based systematically appear. Those
observations were discarded.
26Non-proﬁt maximizing behavior should not come as a surprise in Brazil when analysing public
banks portfolio. Banco do Brasil (BB) and Caixa Econômica Federal (CEF), the two largest
government-owned banks are, respectively, the major players in rural and housing subsidized credit.
BB outstanding rural credit portfolio represents 52% of all directed - and subsidized rural credit in
Brazil. CEF, as of January 2005, accounted for 42% of total subsidized housing ﬁnance operations
in Brazil.
17After these adjustments, the sample consists of 40 banks, representing 67.8%
of total payroll lending volumes as of May 2005. The sample includes 4 out the 5
major private Brazilian banks.
4 Empirical Strategy
The opinions voiced by market participants in the press suggest the three economic
variables that might have been aﬀected by the June 2004 STJ ruling: risk assess-
ment, the pricing of loans, and the amount lent. The empirical strategy consists in
comparing the evolution, over a period of time that contains the ruling, of two prod-
ucts: payroll and standard loans. The diﬀerence in their evolution over the period
is interpreted as the causal eﬀect of the STJ decision, as in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
model.
4.1 The Control Group
As mentioned in Section 2, although payroll lending exists since 1990, only in De-
cember 2003, legislation regulating its application to private sector formal workers
and retirees and pensionaries of social security system was passed. Moreover, only
since January 2003 we have available - and good quality - split data on payroll and
standard personal loans.
The object of interest is a supply eﬀect: has the court decision shifted the supply
of payroll loans? We do not, however, pursue the strategy of searching for exogenous
variation to estimate the supply directly. As it will become clear below, a reduced-
form object is estimated for price, risk, and quantity. The strategy consists of using
standard loans as a control group. This way, one can gauge the eﬀect of the court
decision above and beyond unobserved concurrent factors that might have aﬀected
both the demand and supply of payroll loans.27
27We do not have overall demand shifters, that is, exogenous variation to estimate the supply.
Let alone, product speciﬁc (to payroll loans, for instance) demand shifters. For example, there is
no compelling economic reason why seasonality (a candidate) would aﬀect payroll loans diﬀerently
than standard loans.
18Standard loans are a reasonable control group for payroll loans. The two products
are the same, with the exception of the payroll deduction28. That is, both products
are personal lending operations, consumption oriented and have no formal collateral
or real guarantee attached to. Finally, since standard loans do not have payroll
deduction, they were not directly aﬀected by the June 2004 court ruling.
A fair question is why standard loans exist at all given the presence of an ap-
parently superior very similar credit instrument. As a matter of regulation, payroll
loans were conﬁned to special classes of borrowers up until the December 2003 law,
and the subsequent chartering of banks to provide these loans on a more general
basis.29 In particular, it could be the case that public sector employees were sig-
niﬁcantly more present in payroll vis-à-vis standard loans. This, however, does not
seem to be the case, especially for our speciﬁc sample: payroll lending with the
observed average size consists of both private sector employees (through agreements
with private companies or professional associations) and public servents.
While diﬀerences in the composition of the pool of borrowers is not a threat to
our identiﬁcation strategy, whether these two pools of borrowers changed diﬀerently
over the sample period is. There are two reasons why this does not seem to be
the case. First, the main change in composition of the pool of borrowers occurred
during 2005, when banks started getting chartered by the Social Security Agency
to lend to private sector retirees. Therefore there were no signiﬁcant changes in
the compositions of the pool of borrowers in the two groups. Second, economic
conditions could have changed diﬀerently for the two groups, holding constant the
composition of both pools. This would happen if, for instance, the public sector was
downsizing at the time, or if the private formal sector was experiencing a particularly
turbulent period. Neither were the case.












>Feb/04 and      
< July/04
Treatment: Payroll 45.07 46.08 12.21 8.80
Control: Standard 56.67 53.93 24.62 26.05
Treatment: Payroll 6,83E+07 5,93E+07 1,38E+08 1,13E+08
Control: Standard 6,54E+07 5,90E+07 1,43E+08 1,19E+08
Treatment: Payroll 2.51 2.63 0.55 0.66
Control: Standard 3.17 3.31 0.99 1.13
TABLE 1: Source: Banco Central do Brasil. Sub-sample of 40 banks included in the regression analysis. Market averages, weighted by bank size of operations, 
except for total amount of loans.
Mean Standard Deviation
Average Interest Rate (% points)
Total Amount of Loans (R$)
Average Risk (from categories 1 to 10)
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the variables that are used as regressands
in the analysis below. As expected, the average interest rate is lower in payroll than
in standard loans: the instruments are very similar and the former has wages as
collateral. Similarly, standard loans are riskier, which is consistent with a higher
voluntary - and involuntary - default probability. The amount lent in payroll loans
is higher than in standard loans, and has increased more pronouncedly over the
sample period30.
When one compares the summary statistics for the control and treatment groups,
a few points emerge. First, for payroll loans, both interest rate and risk were slightly
higher than average on the sub-period before the court ruling. For standard loans,
the interest rate was below average, and risk was slightly above average. This is
important for our purposes, since the diﬀerent types of loans could be, on the months
before the ruling, on diﬀerent parts of a mean-reversing process. This does not
appear to be the case, and, if anything, interest rates should tend to increase more
(decrease less) for standard loans, vis-à-vis payroll loans, if a mean-reversing force
is operative. Similarly for risk perception.
As for amount lent, one can see, from both table 1 and ﬁgure 4, an increase in
both categories over the period, with a more pronounced increase for payroll loans.
30For the thirteen banks of the already mentioned sample, granting of payroll loans increased
by 66,7% during the last 12 months. Outstanding volumes more than doubled during the same
period, while total personal loans increased by 50,1% (NEI, BCB 2005).
20The two categories are following, over time, diﬀerent paths, which could lower the
value of standard loans as a control group. However, if anything, the pronounced
upward trend in payroll loans would make it particularly diﬃcult to document a
decrease in payroll loans relative to standard loans.
4.2 The Speciﬁcations
The interest rate and the quantity models are quite similar. An observation is a
product i, oﬀered by a bank b,a tam o n t ht. There are two products, personal
credit with and without payroll automatic debit. Let DECISION be a categorical
variables that assumes the value 1 for July 2004 and all months later. It denotes the
treatment period. 31 PAYROLL is a categorical variable that assumes the value
1 if the product is personal loan with payroll deduction. It identiﬁes the treatment
group. The estimated model for the interest rate is:
∆log(INTEREST)itb = β0 + β1PAYROLLitb + β2DECISIONt
+β3DECISIONt × PAYROLL it +Ω MONTHt + Controls+ εitb
INTERESTibtr is the average interest rate on all loans given by bank b on
product i,a tm o n t ht. The panel unit is a pair bank-product. We are interested in
the level of log eﬀect, but the data is ﬁrst-diﬀerenced to eliminate ﬁxed eﬀects of
the pair bank-product. Controls include the log of the average risk on the banks’
portfolios, the (lagged) total number of loan operations and the (lagged) average size
of the loan operations. Risk is included for obvious reasons, since it should determine
interest and is aﬀected by the decision. Total number of loans is included because,
as we have seen, payroll and non-payroll loans have diﬀerent rates of expansion over
the sample period. Since expansion might aﬀect the quality of the loan portfolio, the
total number of operations should be controlled for. The average size of operations
is included since it is conceivable that banks reacted to the judicial decision by
decreasing exposure on operations by decreasing their size.
31Rigorously, the decision took place in June 2004. It was, however, at the very end of the month
(the 28th), so banks only had time to react to it in July. Therefore, all estimated models consider
the treatment period to start in July 2004.
21The main parameter of interest is β3, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence coeﬃcient. If
the judicial decision had an impact on banks’ pricing of payroll loans, then β3 should
be positive. We run a OLS procedure on this equation, with the two modiﬁcations.
First, we weight observations by the size of banks’ operations on payroll and standard
loans, to arrive at an average market response. Second we correct for between panel
correlation and within panel autocorrelation.
The model can be viewed as a reduced form, in which prices (in this case interest
rates) are regressed on exogenous variables. As in any reduced form, there could be
supply (which is of interest) and demand eﬀects (not of interest) on the parameters.
After controlling for period speciﬁc eﬀects, estimates should be clean of most demand
eﬀects, and β3, the main coeﬃcient of interest, should capture a supply response
to the ruling. Note that, precisely to mitigate capturing demand eﬀects, we lag
variables such total operations and average operations.
The quantity model is similar except that we do not control for the total number
of operations and the average size of operations. We conjecture that these variables
aﬀect primarily the interest rate:32
∆log(Total Loans)itb = β0 + β1PAYROLL itb + β1DECISIONt+
β3DECISIONt × PAYROLL it +Ω MONTHt + Controls+ εitb
The main control now is the ﬁrst-diﬀerence in the log of average risk on the banks’
portfolio. Again, the main parameter of interest is β3, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
coeﬃcient. If banks reacted to the judicial decision by restricting quantity, then β3
should be negative. We estimate the parameters by an OLS and an IV procedure.
Diﬀerently from the interest rate equation, there is empirical reason to believe the
lag of the dependent variable belongs to the right-hand side, and there is also reason
to believe that there is serial correlation on the error term. In this case, OLS could
produce inconsistent estimates (see Arellano and Bond [1991]).33 Similarly to the
32Results are similar whether total loans and average size of loans are included or not.
33Several economic stories could be told to justify the lag of ∆log(Total Loans) to belong, or
22interest model, we weight observations by the size of banks’ operations in personal
lending, and standard errors are corrected for between correlation and within panel
autocorrelation.
For the risk perception model, an observation is a product i, oﬀered by a bank
b,a tam o n t ht. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, the dependent variable, RISKibt,i sa
dummy variable, that assumes the value 1 if the average risk on product i loans
given by bank b at month t is above the median risk for that bank over the period
considered. In the second speciﬁcation, yibt is the average risk on product i’s loans
given the bank b’s at month t. The estimated model is:
RISKitb = β0 + β1PAYROLL ibt + β2DECISIONt+
+β3DECISIONt × PAYROLL ibt+
Controls+Ω MONTHt + εibt
CONTROLSbit are variables that aﬀect risk (such as average size of loans and
total number of loans). In this case it is unnatural to ﬁrst-diﬀerence the data to
eliminate ﬁxed-eﬀects, we include bank dummies. Again, the main coeﬃcient of
interest is β3, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence coeﬃcient. If the judicial decision had
an impact on banks’ risk perception on Payroll Loans, then β3 should be positive:
risk assessment on payroll loans increased compared to standard loans We run a
Logit procedure on this equation, again weighting observations by the size of banks’
operations in personal lending.
Notice that in all models, variation among banks is used. This is crucial, since
the main economic decision unit is a bank. Although the judicial decision hit banks
a tt h es a m et i m e( DECISIONt does not vary over b), banks potentially diﬀer in
their response to the decision, and this provides variation to estimate the coeﬃcient
of interest. In the end, the response of an average bank is estimated, with larger
not, to the right-hand side of both the interest and the quantity equations. Since this is not our
variable of interest, we take an agnostic empirical approach, and evaluate whether empirically it
belongs to the equation and take proper econometric steps to correct (i.e., look for exogenous
variation) if it does.
23banks counting more than smaller ones.
5 Results and Discussion
5.1 The Risk Equation
We start by the risk equation. In table 2 the dependent variable is a dummy for
whether bank b’s average risk on the product operation (standard and payroll loans)
is above the median risk for the whole sample (January 2003 to June 2005) The
main hypothesis is tested in column (1). The sample is restricted to 5 months
before the decision and 5 months after the decision The coeﬃcient associated with
the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence regressor (β3) is 0.357, and it is quite precisely estimated
(it is signiﬁcant at the 1% level). This means that, relative to standard loans, the
probability that the operation on payroll loans was above the median risk increased.
The model is non-linear and there is no immediate way to interpret "above the
median risk" is an economically meaningful way, so it is diﬃcult to evaluate this
coeﬃcient quantitatively. One can, however, state that, qualitatively, risk perception
on payroll loans increases in period following the court decision. The probability
of the average risk on the banks’ portfolio being above the the median decreases
over the sub-sample period, for both loan (coeﬃcient on Judicial Decision, −0.391).
However, it decreases much less for payroll deduction loans, only −0.184. Expansion
in the number of operations is associated with less risk (a 1% increase in the number
of operations decreases the probability of being above the median in roughly 15.4%),
which is likely to indicate that a larger number of operations (and probably a lower
average size) provide better diversiﬁcation, although this result is not robust to
diﬀerent sub-samples.
24Dependent Variable: dummy for average risk above median
Sub-Sample: month > 
Feb/04 and             < 
Dec/04
Sub-Sample: 
month         
> Feb/04
Sub-Sample: month > 





(1) (2) (3) (4)
- 0.184 -0.220* -0.386** 0.153
(0.137) (0.120) (0.176) (0.116)
-0.391** -0.590*** - -
(0.172) (0.154) - -
0.357*** 0.166 - -
(0.078) (0.128) - -
-0.154** -0.017 -0.309* 0.068
(0.071) (0.050) (0.181) (0.060)
0.071 -0.056** 0.102 -0.020
(0.061) (0.026) (0.157) (0.026)
- - -0.607*** -0.296*
- - (0.175) -0.184
- - -0.455*** -0.563***
- - (0.122) (0.181)
Number of Observations 543 993 626 667
TABLE 2: Source: Banco Central do Brasil. Logit marginal effects estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Control Group: 
Loans without Payroll Deduction. Weighted by Size of Banks operation. *** = Difference between sub-samples in estimated coefficient 
statatistically significant at the 1% level, ** = 5% level, *= 10% level. Bank and month dummies included. Judicial decision taking effect 






Payroll LoanxDummy Robust 
Log(Average Size Operation)
Table 2: Average Risk above median
Although month speciﬁc dummies are included, it can always be the case that,
for some unaccounted reason, risk perception was decreasing less for payroll deduc-
tion loans relative to plain personal loans, and this had nothing to do with the
court ruling. For this reason, we ﬁrst expand the period under consideration to
all months after the law regulating payroll loans passed through congress. If the
estimated diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence had nothing to do with the judicial decision, one
would expect that the estimated coeﬃcient on the interaction term to remain some-
what constant. As one can see in column (2), this is not case. Expanding the sample
makes the "eﬀect" of the judicial decision decrease by half, and it is no longer statis-
tically signiﬁcant, although the sample is almost twice the size. Additionally, faux
treatment dummies are speciﬁed, to check whether the same pattern occurs if we
consider artiﬁcial "treatment" dates. In column (4), the fake treatment is month 25,
and the sample is restricted on purpose to exclude the months before the judicial
decision The estimated fake "diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence" coeﬃcient has a reverse sign,
and it is well estimated. If anything, the discrepancy between standard and payroll
loans was the opposite for this sub-sample. Finally, the fake treatment period is
put on month 14, and the sample is restricted to months before the judicial deci-
25sion (column (3)). Again, the coeﬃcient has the opposite sign, i.e., risk increases
in standard loans relative to payroll loans in this sub-sample with a fake treatment
period at 14. Most likely, this captures the eﬀect of the bill regulating payroll loans
passing through congress.
Results are similar when risk is measured by the average risk rating on the banks’
portfolio (see table 3). There are two diﬀerences though. First, we diﬀerence the
log of the data to eliminate for ﬁxed-eﬀects.34 Second, with average risk rating as
the dependent variable one has to account for the possibility that the dependent
variable has persistence over time. For this reason, several diﬀerent speciﬁcations
are applied. First, an OLS model is used in which the ﬁrst and the second lags of the
dependent variable are included as explanatory variables. The standard errors of the
estimated coeﬃcients are corrected for between panel correlation and within panel
autocorrelation. Again, banks’ risk perception on payroll loans increased relative to
standard loans: the estimated coeﬃcient on the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence parameters is
0.014, and it is signiﬁcant at the 1% level (column (1)). Economically, risk perception
increased in payroll loans by roughly 1.4 percentage points. In column (2), a model
for the dynamics of the errors term is imposed, and the parameters are estimated
by a Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) procedure. The results for the
parameter of interest (β3) are exactly the same.
34This is tantamount to controlling for ﬁxed eﬀects, and should be the prefered procedure. When
the dummy for risk above median is used as a dependent variable, it is not natural to ﬁrst-diﬀerence
the data, and therefore bank dummies are included. See Woodridge [2002].
26Dependent Variable: ∆log(Average Risk)
Sub-Sample: 
month > 








Feb/04 and    
< Dec/04 +
Sub-Sample: 




Sep/03 and    
< July/04‡ %
Sub-Sample: 
month        
> July/04‡•
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Payroll Loan -0.010** -0.006** -0.012** -0.013* 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
Judicial Decision 0.009* 0.007 -0.001 0.001 - -
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) - -
Payroll LoanxJudicial Decision 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.009 0.006 --
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) --
∆log(Average Risk) t-1 0.544*** 0.499*** 0.497*** 0.493*** 0.460*** 0.505***
(0.101) (0.030) (0.030) (0.009) (0.016) (0.012)
∆log(Average Risk) t-2 0.008 0.002 - - - -
(0.101) (0.024) - - - -
∆Log(Number of Operations) 0.073 0.065*** 0.073*** 0.025*** 0.037*** 0.022***
(0.090) (0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
∆Log(Average Size Operation) 0.103** 0.008*** 0.018*** 0.002** -0.000 0.002**
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Dummy Robust - - - - 0.002 -0.015*
- - - - (0.005) (0.009)
Payroll LoanxDummy Robust  - - - - -0.006 -0.017**
- - - - (0.004) (0.008)
Number of Observations 543 543 543 993 626 667
TABLE 3: Source: Banco Central do Brasil. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Control Group: Loans without Payroll Deduction. Weighted by Size of 
Banks operation. *** = Difference between sub-samples in estimated coefficient statatistically significant at the 1% level, ** = 5% level, *= 10% level. 
Month dummies included. Judicial decision taking effect on July/2004 (month 12). † = OLS estimates, with standard error of estimated coefficients 
corrected for between panel correlation and within panel autocorrelation using the Praiss-Winsten procedure. % = Dummy if month > 13. • = dummy if 
month >24. ‡ = Feasible Generalized Least Squares with AR(1) model for within panel auto-correlation.  +  = IV estimates with  Deltalog(Average Risk) t-
2 as instrument for DeltaLog(Average Risk) t-1
Table 3: Average Risk
There is, however, the possibility that there is persistence both in the process
of the dependent variable and the unobserved factors that aﬀect risk (the error
term). Columns (1) and (2) suggest the second lag of the ∆log(Average Risk)
does not belong to the equation. Therefore, it arises as a natural instrument for
∆log(Average Risk)t−1 under the identifying assumption the error term has only
one period persistence.3536 Now, there is not enough independent variation to es-
timate the parameter of interest: the p-value of estimation is roughly 13%. The
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence coeﬃcient is, nonetheless, still positive, although with a lower
magnitude (0.009). Columns (4) to (6) present the same robustness checks as in ta-
ble 3. Results, and corresponding interpretations, are qualitatively similar.
Results could be driven by two factors unrelated to the STJ ruling, but implied
35Exactly because the second lag does not appear to be a explanatory variable, using further lags
as instrument would not be awarranted since they do not arise naturally as shifts to the endogenous
variable that are not related to the unobserved determinants of risk perception (the error term).
36As with any identifying assumption it is impossible to verify it empirically. Since the data is
in the ﬁrst-diﬀerence of logs, there is no compelling reason why adjustments to unobserved shocks
to risk would take more than a month to be incorporated to the banks’ credit rating decision.
27by heterogeneity in the dynamics of the treatment and control groups. First, as
table 1 shows, standard loans are, as expected, riskier than payroll loans. If there
are general institutional advances in credit markets during the period, and if there
are decreasing returns in risk improvement, then one should observe a decrease in
riskiness of standard vis-à-vis payroll loans because the former started at a higher
level of risk. However, if this was the case, one would expect that the same pattern
would emerge for all sub-samples of whole period. As columns (3) and (4) in table
2 indicate, risk perception on payroll loans decreases vis-à-vis standard loans in the
periods before and after the STJ ruling. Same is true in table 3 (columns (5) and
(6)).
Second, as Figure 4 shows, payroll loans boomed during the period, possibly due
to the approval of the December 2003 law. Expansions might be risk-increasing,
i.e., the marginal borrower may be worse than the infra-marginal ones. If this is
the case, the pool of borrowers on payroll lending would be changing, compared to
standard lending, in such a way that would produce the result regardless of the court
ruling. There are, however, at least two reasons why this story cannot rationalize
the results. First, the number of operations is controlled for. In table 3, for example,
changes in the log of average risk are explained by the court ruling with variation
above and beyond changes in log of number and average size of operations. Indeed,
since the model is in ﬁrst diﬀerences, results are not only controlled for the fact that
larger banks might have lower risk borrowers, but also for within bank expansions
of payroll vis-à-vis standard operations. Second, the same argument as in the last
paragraph applies. Figure 4 shows that payroll operations rose, relative to standard
ones, throughout the period. Hence, if the changing pool of borrowers argument
would apply, one should verify the same increase in riskiness of payroll vis-à-vis
standard operations throughout the period. As columns (3) and (4) in table 2 and
(5) and (6) in table 3 show, this does not seem to be the case.
285.2 The Quantity Equation
The results for the quantity equation are presented in tables 4 and 5.
Dependent Variable: ∆Log(Amount of Loans)
Sub-Sample: 
month          
> Feb/04 and     
< Dec/04
Sub-Sample: 
month > Feb/04 
and < Dec/04
Sub-Sample: 
month > Feb/04 
and < Dec/04
Sub-Sample: month 
> Feb/04 and        
< Dec/04            
(IV estimates)†
Sub-Sample: month 
> Feb/04 and < 
Dec/04                (IV 
estimates)†
∆Log(Amount of Loans) t - 1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
- - 0.346*** 0.580*** 0.586**
- - (0.105) (0.225) (0.237)
Payroll Loan  0.065***  0.065*** 0.044*** 0.033* 0.032*
(0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019)
Judicial Decision 0.038** 0.026 0.035** 0.034** 0.077*
(0.016) (0.018) (0.015) (0.016) (0.041)
Payroll LoanxJudicial Decision -0.058** -0.058** -0.045** -0.038** -0.037*
(0.024) (0.025) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
∆Log(Average Risk) 0.077 0.026 0.072 0.079 0.029
(0.468) (0.446) (0.437) (0.420) (0.404)
∆Log(Average Risk) t - 1 -0.308* -0.287 -0.289 -0.225 -0.183
(0.180) (0.202) (0.187) (0.218) (0.240)
Date Dummy? no yes no no yes
Number of Observations 507 507 507 507 507
TABLE 4: Source: Banco Central do Brasil. OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Control Group: Loans without Payroll Deduction. Weighted 
by Size of Banks operation. *** = Difference between sub-samples in estimated coefficient statatistically significant at the 1% level, ** = 5% level, *= 10% level. 
Bank dummies included. Judicial decision taking effect on July/2004 (month 18). † Instrument: second lag of ∆Log(Amount of Loans)
Column (1) presents the simplest possible model: OLS omitting ∆Log(Amount
of Loans)t-1 as an explanatory variable and no period dummies. As expected, oper-
ations of payroll loans are larger (6.5% more), and quantities of both standard and
payroll loans appear to be increasing over time (coeﬃcient on Judicial Decision, 3.8%
on average in the sub-period between February 2004 and October 2004), as ﬁgure
4 suggested. Despite the markedly diﬀerent slopes of standard and payroll loans,
the judicial decision did have a negative eﬀect on payroll loans: relative to standard
loans, payroll loans decrease when one compares before and after the court ruling.
Indeed, after controlling for average risk, payroll loan quantities decreased 5.8%,
between the 5 month sub-period before the court ruling and the 5-month sub-period
after the ruling. Inclusion of period dummies hardly changes the results (column
(2)). Results are, however, slightly diﬀerent when the lag of the dependent variable
in included: one can see (column (3)) that part of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence co-
eﬃcient was capturing some variation of the ∆Log(Amount of Loans)t-1. Results,
however, remain considerably similar.
29The presence of the lag of the dependent variable poses again the challenge
of searching for exogenous variation to estimate the coeﬃcient associated with
∆Log(Amount of Loans)t-1 since there could also be persistence on the error term.
Again, we follow the strategy of using the second lag (∆Log(Amount of Loans)t-1)
as an instrument. Columns (4) and (5) present the results. It does appear that part
of the estimated coeﬃcient in columns (1) to (3) are unduly capturing variation due
to omission of explanatory variables (which are in the dynamics of the error term).
The eﬀect, however, still survives: in the most unfavorable speciﬁcation, there is
3.7% diﬀerence in the trends of standard and payroll loans when periods before and
after the court ruling is considered. This result is not terribly well estimated, but
one could reject the null that it is zero at the 5.8% level. (column (5)).
Table 5 presents diﬀerent speciﬁcations. In column (1) and (3), standard er-
ror estimates are corrected for between panel correlation and within panel auto-
correlation. Notice that the estimates of the diﬀ-in-diﬀ parameters are even more
precisely estimated. When a FGLS procedure is used, results are similar (column
(2)). These results do not account for the possible omitted variable bias due to
the presence of ∆Log(Amount of Loans)t-2, but do suggest that the statistical sig-
niﬁcance in table 4 is not due to under-estimation of standard errors. Column (4)
checks the robustness of the results in the same spirit as in tables 2 and 3: it appears
that the estimated diﬀ-in-diﬀ coeﬃcient is not due to a long term pattern over the
whole sample period. When the fake treatment period 25 is used, and the sample is
restricted to after the court ruling, the result disappear. Similar robustness results
hold for the whole period and for only the period before the court ruling.
30Dependent Variable:∆Log(Amount of Loans)
Sub-Sample: 
month > Feb/04 








Feb/04 and     
< Dec/04†
Sub-Sample: 
month > July/04 
%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.222 0.150*** 0.189 -
(0.118) (0.054) (0.182) -
 0.052***  0.057***  0.053***  0.036*
(0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.021)
0.035**  0.057*** 0.057*** -
(0.017) (0.022) (0.019) -
-0.051*** -0.053** -0.052*** -
(0.018) (0.024) (0.018) -
0.033 0.067 0.003 -0.082
(0.144) (0.093) (0.151) (0103)
-0.280** -0.273*** -0.278* -0.161*
(0.141) (0.093) (0.154) (0.098)
-- - 0 . 0 2 0
- - - (0.021)
-- - 0.015
-- - (0.034)
Date Dummy? no yes yes yes
Number of Observations 507 507 507 665
∆Log(Average Risk) t -1
TABLE 5: Source: Banco Central do Brasil. OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Control Group: Loans 
without Payroll Deduction. Probability-weighted by Size of Bank operation. *** = Difference between sub-samples in 
estimated coefficient statatistically significant at the 1% level, ** = 5% level, *= 10% level. Bank dummies included. Judicial 
decision taking effect on July/2004 (month 18). † Standard Error of Estimated Coefficients corrected for between panel 
correlation and within panel autocorrelation using the Praiss-Winsten procedure. ‡: Feasible Generalized Least Squares 
assuming errors within panels follow an AR(1) process. % = Dummy Robust = 1, if month > 18, most favorable model: FGLS 
assuming errors within panels follow an AR(1) process.







Table 5: Amount of Loans (2)
5.3 The Pricing Equation
The eﬀect of the court ruling on the interest rates of payroll loans can be found in
table 6. A couple of comments are necessary. Diﬀerently from the quantity regres-
sion, the number of operations and the average size of the operation are included.
We do so because there might be (dis)economies of scale involved in granting loans.
Both variables are lagged one period to mitigate the possibility of capturing de-
mand side eﬀects. Second, it is important once again to emphasize that the data
on prices is problematic, specially for interpretation on levels. Taking the log and
ﬁrst-diﬀerencing the data ameliorate somehow the problems with levels but do not
solve it. Interpretation on changes, however, is less troublesome and we proceed by
doing so, specially since the results with interest rates are consistent with the results
on quantities and risk perception.
31Dependent Variable: ∆Log(interest rate)
Sub-Sample: 
month > Feb/04 
and < Dec/04†
Sub-Sample: 
month > Feb/04 
and < Dec/04†
Sub-Sample: 
month        
> Feb/04 and   
< Dec/04
Sub-Sample: 
month         
> Feb/04 and    
< Dec/04†
Sub-Sample: 
month         
> July/04† %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.019 0.008 0.008 - -
(0.193) (0.193) (0.039) - -
-0.063*** -0.061*** -0.061 - 0.062*** -0.019
(0.020) (0.020) (0.047) (0.021) (0.025)
-0.075*** -0.143*** -0.143** -0.095*** -
(0.028) (0.035) (0.063) (0.031) -
0.073*** 0.071*** 0.071 0.071*** -
(0.024) (0.024) (0.060) (0.026) -
-0.464 -0.475 -0.475 -0.480 0.408
(0.315) (0.334) (0.273) (-0.325) (0.570)
0.430** 0.410* 0.410* 0.423** 0.363
(0.221) (0.239) (0.379) (0.179) (0.582)
-0.004 -0.016 -0.016 -0.011 -0.134
(0.098) (0.103) (0.182) (0.101) (0.087)
0.049 0.045 0.045 0.045 -0.036***
(0.024) (0.052) (0.044) (0.053) (0.013)
- - - - 0.080*
- - - - (0.47)
- - - - 0.057
- - - - (0.058)
Date Dummy? no yes yes yes no
Number of Observations 507 507 507 507 665
Dummy Robust
∆Log(interest rate) t - 1
TABLE 6: Source: Banco Central do Brasil. OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Control Group: Loans without Payroll Deduction. 
Weighted by Size of Banks operation. *** = Difference between sub-samples in estimated coefficient statatistically significant at the 1% level, ** = 5% 
level, *= 10% level. Bank dummies included. Judicial decision taking effect on July/2004 (month 18). † Standard Error of Estimated Coefficients 
corrected for between panel correlation and within panel autocorrelation using the Praiss-Winsten procedure. % = dummy = 1 if month > 24.




Log(Average Size of Operation t - 1)
Log(Number of Operations t - 1)
∆Log(Average Risk)
Payroll LoanxDummy Robust
Table 6: Interest Rate
Column (1) shows the OLS results when the lag of the dependent variable is
included, but not the period dummies. Consistent with the quantity and risk per-
ception results, and with the perception of important market participants, the court
ruling appears to have induced an increase in the interest rate charged on payroll
loans. After controlling for number of operations, average size of operations and risk,
there is a marked diﬀerence (7.3%) between the trends of interest rates on payroll
and standard loans before and after the court ruling. Consistent with the general
perception in the market, interest rates on payroll loans are lower than those on
standard loans (6.3%). Estimates suggest risk perception does indeed aﬀect interest
rate as expected: while one cannot reject the null hypothesis that contemporane-
ous changes in risk perception aﬀect interest rates, one period lagged increases in
risk perception does induce an increase in prices of loans. After standard errors of
estimation are corrected for between panel correlation and within panel serial corre-
lation, the lag of the dependent variable does not appear to belong to the equation.
32This renders results less vulnerable to dynamic panel bias.
Columns (2), (3) and (4) present slightly diﬀerent speciﬁcations. Most notewor-
thy is column (3), in which the OLS standard errors of estimation are not corrected.
Here, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that there are not diﬀerence between
standard and payroll loans with respect to the court ruling. The estimates suggest
that correction on the standard deviation provides better (more precisely) estimates
for the diﬀ-in-diﬀ parameter. Column (5) presents the same robustness check as in
all other tables, and it is again consistent with the previous results.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The results in this paper suggest the conjecture, of some market participants, that
the June 2004 court ruling had an adverse eﬀect on the market performance of
payroll loans. Results arise, and are consistent among each other, for risk perception,
quantity of loans, and interest rates, with the data caveat for the latter. Data
suggests that the ruling increase risk perception on payroll loans, which in turn led
banks to restrict quantity and increase interest rates.
These results are far from obvious. Several key market players anticipated them,
but not all. It could have been that lenders had ignored the ruling. As Figure 4
eloquently suggests, the court ruling did not prevent the boom of payroll loans. It
did, however, abate it, and made it such that terms to borrowers were worse.
This paper provides some evidence on the missing link of the institutions-economic
performance nexus literature: the micro evidence. Far from contradicting the lit-
erature, our results corroborate it with evidence drawn from the unit of decision
making: lenders in this case. It reinforces the policy recipes already implied by the
literature. Better protection from expropriation most likely increases general wel-
fare, as it improves market performance in informationally and incentive problematic
markets, such as the credit market.
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